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Compassionate release procedures typically allow prisoners to
seek early release because of serious terminal, non-terminal, and/or
age-related health issues.1  In addition to a federal procedure,2 nearly
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every U.S. state has at least one compassionate release procedure.3
Across U.S. states, parole emerges as the most common method of
compassionate release,4 often labeled “medical parole.”5  Medical
parole procedures can vary in form.  Some expressly exclude
categories of prisoners based on their conviction type;6 others
determine eligibility solely on age.7  Some include terminal and non-
terminal illnesses as eligible conditions,8 whereas others apply solely
to terminally ill prisoners with or without a defined life expectancy.9
Third parties (such as relatives and lawyers) are expressly allowed to
petition on behalf of prisoners in some procedures,10 and some
procedures include express time-frames to guide petitioners through
2. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)(ii).  Federal prisoners may apply for compassionate
release (also referred to as a “reduction in sentence”) in two instances.  First, they may
apply if they have “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” which can relate to medical
condition(s), age, family circumstances, or other reasons.  Or, second, they may apply if
they are aged seventy or above, have served thirty years in prison, and the Director of
the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) determines s/he is not a danger to others.  Following a
process involving federal corrections and the BOP, the prisoner’s federal sentencing
court (directed by U.S. Sentencing Commission guidelines) makes a final decision. See
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NO. 5050.50 COMPASSIONATE RELEASE/REDUCTION IN SENTENCE:
PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF 18 U.S.C. §§ 3582 AND 4205(G) (2019).
3. See generally MARY PRICE, EVERYWHERE AND NOWHERE: COMPASSIONATE
RELEASE IN THE STATES (2018), https://famm.org/wp-content/uploads/Exec-Summary-
Report.pdf; Everywhere and Nowhere: Compassionate Release in the States, State
Memos, FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, https://famm.org/our-work/
compassionate-release/everywhere-and-nowhere/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2020); Cooper,
supra note 1 at 18-19.
4. Cooper, supra note 1, at 44; see also Nancy R. Gartner & Rolando V. del
Carmen, Releasing the Ailing and Aging: A Comprehensive Analysis of Medical Parole
Legislation in the United States, 52 CRIM. LAW BULL. 1, 1 (2016) (“Thirty-five states and
the District of Columbia currently have a form of medical parole.”).
5. Cooper, supra note 1, at 22.
6. See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:574.20(B)(2) (West 2018) (“Medical parole shall
not be available to any offender serving a sentence for a conviction of first degree
murder (R.S. 14:30) or second degree murder (R.S. 14:30.1) or an offender who is
awaiting execution.”).
7. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. IV, § II, para. 2 (providing the Georgia State Board of
Pardons and Paroles has the authority to “parole any person who is age 62 or older”).
8. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-29-404(a)(1)-(2) (West 2019) (stating that
Arkansas’s Medical Parole procedure applies to both prisoners that are “[p]ermanently
incapacitated” or “terminally ill.”).
9. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 54-131b (West 2012), 54-131c (West 1989).
Connecticut’s Medical Parole procedure applies exclusively to terminally ill prisoners,
who are defined as having a terminal condition, disease, or syndrome that results in the
prisoner being so debilitated or incapacitated as to be physically incapable of presenting
a danger to society.  A terminal condition, disease, or syndrome “includes, but is not
limited to, any prognosis by a licensed physician that the inmate has six months or less
to live.” Id.
10. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-131e (West 2004) (providing that a “request for a
medical diagnosis in order to determine eligibility for medical parole” includes the
“inmate’s spouse, parent, guardian, grandparent, aunt or uncle, sibling, child over the
age of eighteen years, or attorney”).
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relevant processes.11  Generally, decision-makers (i.e., parole board
members) must evaluate medical evidence, determine a prisoner’s risk
to public safety, and—if appropriate—set release conditions.12
Numerous studies have investigated compassionate release
procedures.13  These studies have identified various limitations in
practices, including the absence of both comprehensive reporting and
tracking systems and internal appeals processes14—findings that
specifically motivate this paper.  These absences contribute to there
being limited knowledge about what issues petitioners would raise on
appeal, how competent authorities would resolve those issues, and
whether the approaches taken by either party would map to existing
concerns about compassionate release.  Thus, it is not apparent what
medical parole-related issues petitioners or appellate authorities
would deem fair or unfair.  This lack of knowledge frustrates
evaluation of existing practices and the implementation of evidence-
informed reform, including recommendations made for model medical
parole procedures.
One way to address this dearth of knowledge is to examine
medical parole-related petitions in U.S. courts.  This paper does just
that.  To set the scene, Part I summarizes the interplay of prisoner
health(care), compassionate release, and the parole system.  Part II
outlines the rationale and design of our study, which sought to
investigate: (1) what issues petitioners raise in medical parole-related
petitions to U.S. courts; (2) how courts resolve such petitions; and (3)
whether the approaches of petitioners and courts highlight existing
concerns about compassionate release.  Part III reports our findings.
In sum, case law reveals that petitioners have raised issues
concerning frustrated access to the medical parole process, the denial
of medical parole, irregularities in medical parole processes, improper
application of eligibility and exclusion criteria, and the provision of
inadequate medical care in prison.  Judges generally dismiss appeals,
relying on the high standards of proof required to prove eligibility or
improper parole-board decision-making; the discretionary nature of
parole; standards of review that are highly deferential to parole
11. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 3550 (West 2017) (including time limits for
relevant actions).
12. See generally FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, NEW YORK (2018),
https://famm.org/wp-content/uploads/New-York_Final.pdf (providing a useful example
across all these areas, namely evaluation of medical evidence, risk to society, and
attachment of release conditions).
13. See, e.g., PRICE, supra note 3; Marjorie P. Russell, Too Little, Too Late, Too
Slow: Compassionate Release of Terminally Ill Prisoners—Is the Cure Worse Than the
Disease?, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 799 (1994); Gartner & del Carmen, supra note 4; Cooper,
supra note 1.
14. See generally infra notes 52-63.
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authorities; and a lack of properly legally postured claims.  Case law
also reveals a propensity for prisoners to act pro se.  Overall, case law
can be mapped to four thematic areas where concerns about
compassionate release practices already exist, namely (1) eligibility
and exclusions, (2) releasing authorities, (3) processes, and (4) support
for petitioners.  The authors conclude these findings further the call
for reforming compassionate release to better serve both the interests
of wider society and the United States’ large, ageing, and medically
compromised prison population.
I. PRISONER HEALTH(CARE), COMPASSIONATE RELEASE,
AND PAROLE
America has a large and ageing prison population, imprisoning
approximately 2.3 million adults15 with one third of prisoners ex-
pected to be aged fifty-five years or older by 2030.16  High incarcera-
tion rates (and the increased medical needs of ageing prisoners) have
drawn greater attention17 to the interplays of incarceration and
health(care).  Following Estelle v. Gamble,18 federal law provides
that—because a prisoner must rely on the authorities for treatment—
the state has an “obligation to provide [adequate] medical care for
those whom it is punishing by incarceration.”19  A “deliberate indiffer-
ence”20 to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury violates the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, al-
though inadvertent or negligent failures to provide adequate care do
not.21  There has been particular focus on how states deliver adequate
healthcare to large prison populations, which are known to suffer from
higher rates of disease than the general population.22  Ultimately, cor-
rections facilities are required to engage in the complicated and ex-
pensive task of “medical management”23 of increasing numbers of
15. WENDY SAWYER & PETER WAGNER, MASS INCARCERATION: THE WHOLE PIE 2020
(2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html (“The American criminal jus-
tice system holds almost 2.3 million people . . . .”) (last visited Apr. 7, 2020).
16. AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, AT AMERICA’S EXPENSE: THE MASS INCARCERATION
OF THE ELDERLY 5 (2012).
17. NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN
THE UNITED STATES 203 (2014).
18. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
19. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
20. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
21. Id. at 105-06.
22. DAVID CLOUD, ON LIFE SUPPORT: PUBLIC HEALTH IN THE AGE OF MASS INCAR-
CERATION 5 (2014).
23. Jonathan Simon, The Return of the Medical Model: Disease and the Meaning of
Imprisonment from John Howard to Brown v. Plata, 48 HARV. L. REV. 217, 248 (2013).
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prisoners with complex medical needs who need compassion.24  How-
ever, despite corrections institutions serving an important role in pro-
moting prisoner health(care),25 they “too often serve as ill-equipped
treatment providers of last resort for medically underserved,
marginalized people.”26
This situation urges stakeholders to consider what circumstances,
if any, justify early release on health grounds.  Despite the many dis-
tractions27 that accompany this question, compassionate release is a
staple of the U.S. criminal justice system.  The federal government28
and all but one state clearly provide for compassionate release,29 and
there are various examples of political will to broaden eligibility.  For
instance, the First Step Act of 201830 broadened compassionate re-
lease for federal prisoners, allowing applications in a relatively wide
set of circumstances.31  The bill passed the House of Representatives
(358–36)32 and the Senate (87–12)33 by a landslide.  States have seen
efforts to widen compassionate release procedures too, including
through establishing medical parole.34
24. Robert B. Greifinger, Is it Politic to Limit Our Compassion?, 27 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 234, 236 (1999) (noting terminally ill prisoners are in particular need of
compassion).
25. NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 17, at 204.
26. CLOUD, supra note 22, at 5.
27. Greifinger, supra note 24, at 234.
28. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
29. PRICE, supra note 3, at 12 (“We found that 49 states and the District of Colum-
bia provide one or more forms of compassionate release.”) Iowa is seemingly the only
state absent a clearly identifiable procedure. See FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINI-
MUMS, IOWA (2018), https://famm.org/wp-content/uploads/Iowa_Final.pdf.  Note, how-
ever, as the memo indicates, the media reports there has been a compassionate release
case in Iowa, but there are no identifiable procedures.
30. 18 U.S.C. § 3631 (2018).
31. Nationally, the First Step Act, signed into federal law in late 2018, allows pris-
oners to circumvent a Bureau of Prisons denial of eligibility for compassionate release
by appealing directly to the sentencing court.  In considering a motion for a prisoner’s
release, the federal court may grant the relevant motion if (1) the prisoner meets spe-
cific age and term-length criteria, or (2) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant
release.  Determinations of extraordinary and compelling must align with applicable
policy statements issued by the U. S. Sentencing Commission.  Because of this stipula-
tion, federal courts may consider a multitude of factors including a prisoner’s medical
condition, age, and family circumstances. See 18 U.S.C. § 3631.
32. Final Vote Results for Roll Call 448, 115th Con., 2nd Sess., http://
clerk.house.gov/evs/2018/roll448.xml.
33. Roll Call Vote 271, 115th Con., 2nd Sess., https://www.senate.gov/legislative/
LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=115&session=2&vote=00271.
34. For example, there have been unsuccessful but sustained efforts to legislate for
a broader compassionate release procedure in Arizona.  Between 1991 and 2015, eight
bills seeking to establish a medical parole procedure were introduced in the Arizona
House of Representatives.  These bills—in short—aimed to allow prisoners with an “in-
capacitating physical condition, disease or syndrome” to apply to the BOEC for release if
within one year of release, parole eligibility, or (if neither of the latter two) death. See
H.B. 2334, 40th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 1991); H.B. 2678, 48th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.
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Although most states have restricted or eliminated parole,35 the
parole system emerges as the most common method of compassionate
release across U.S. states,36 with specific procedures often labelled
“medical parole.”37  Described as “an act of grace: the dispensation of
mercy by the government to an individual prisoner deemed worthy,”38
and with roots in rehabilitative justice,39 parole fits comfortably with
the concept of compassion.  In the United States, parole takes two
forms: mandatory parole and discretionary parole.40  Medical parole is
generally an example of the latter, which gives a parole board—a
group of ten or fewer individuals, usually political appointees41—dis-
cretion in deciding whether to release the prisoner and what post-re-
lease restrictions to impose.42  Experienced in reviewing evidence,
evaluating cases, balancing equities, drawing conclusions, and impos-
ing conditions, parole boards are viewed as competent authorities to
make compassionate release decisions,43 although broad-brush and
(Ariz. 2007); H.B. 2189, 49th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2009); H.B. 2688, 49th Leg., 2nd
Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010); H.B. 2380, 50th Leg. Sess., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011); H.B.
2531, 50th Leg. Sess., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2012); H.B. 2374, 51st Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess.
(Ariz. 2014); H.B. 2355, 52nd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2015).  California is another
example.  In 2014, a federal court ordered California to expand its medical parole pro-
gram as part of the effort to reduce prison crowding. See CAL. DEP’T OF CORRS. & REHA-
BILITATION, Medical Parole Hearings, https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/bph/mph-overview/ (last
visited Apr. 7, 2020).
35. JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER REEN-
TRY 65 (2003).
36. Cooper, supra note 1, at 44.; see also Gartner & del Carmen, supra note 4, at 1
(“Thirty-five states and the District of Columbia currently have a form of medical
parole.”).
37. Cooper, supra note 1, at 22.
38. Daniel S. Medwed, The Innocent Prisoner’s Dilemma: Consequences of Failing
to Admit Guilt at Parole Hearings, 93 IOWA L. REV. 491, 493 (2008); see also Mary West-
Smith et al., Denial of Parole: An Inmate Perspective, 64 FED. PROB. J. 3, 3 (2000); Escoe
v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492 (1935) (“Probation or suspension of sentence comes as an
act of grace to one convicted of a crime . . . . “).
39. PETERSILIA, supra note 35, at 55. Parole is considered one part of a broader
nineteenth-century penal reform trend away from punishment and toward
rehabilitation.
40. Daniel M. Fetsco, Early Release from Prison in Wyoming: An Overview of Pa-
role in Wyoming and Elsewhere and an Examination of Current and Future Trends, 11
WYO. L. REV. 99, 110 (2011).  States using mandatory parole simply rely on a statutory
formula specifying a percentage of the inmate’s sentence plus credit for good time
served. If the conditions are met, the inmate is released and assigned some form of
parole supervision for a specified period of time (typically the remainder of the original
sentence).  Discretionary parole, as its name suggests, gives a parole board discretion in
deciding whether to release the inmate and what post-release restrictions to impose.
See generally PETERSILIA, supra note 35, at 59-61.
41. PETERSILIA, supra note 35, at 61.
42. See Fetsco, supra note 40.
43. Russell, supra note 13, at 836.
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idiosyncratic decision-making has been noted as a consequence of in-
stitutional strain.44
Empowered to evaluate public safety and decide on early release,
parole boards “occupy an influential, if little recognized, niche across
the correctional landscape . . . .”45  The use of parole to support imple-
mentation of administrative policies aimed at reducing prison over-
crowding and violence demonstrates this.46  Indeed, medical parole
statutes arose as a means to reduce correctional costs,47 with some
procedures specifically established in the 1980s to address the signifi-
cant number of prisoners with HIV/AIDS.48  Notably, at the time of
writing, there are calls to use compassionate release as a vehicle for
alleviating pressures associated with the COVID-19 pandemic.49
II. STUDY RATIONALE AND DESIGN
There is a growing research base about compassionate release,50
including studies focused on identifying and analyzing existing proce-
dures.51  These studies have raised various concerns about compas-
44. See generally West-Smith et al., supra note 38.
45. Edward E. Rhine et al., The Future of Parole Release, 46 CRIME & JUST. 279,
279 (2016).
46. PETERSILIA, supra note 35, at 62 (citing A. Keith Bottomley, Parole in Transi-
tion: A Comparative Study of Origins, Developments, and Prospects for the 1990s, 12
CRIME & JUST. 319, 325 (1990)).
47. Gartner & del Carmen, supra note 4, at 2 (“To cope with tightening budgets
while protecting public safety, medical parole statutes emerged as a potential means to
reduce correctional costs.”).
48. Id. (citing John A. Beck, Compassionate Release from New York State Prisons:
Why Are So Few Getting Out?, 27 J. OF L., MED. & ETHICS 216, 220 (1999)) (“Some of the
first medical parole programs, located in New York and California, were set up in the
mid-1980s to help state and local correctional facilities address the overwhelming num-
ber of inmates afflicted with HIV/AIDS.”); Editorial, New York City Steps Up Program
to Free Sick Inmates, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 9, 1987, at 13A.
49. See, e.g., Kevin Ring, COVID-19 Gives Us an Urgent Argument for Compassion-
ate Release, THE HILL (Mar. 26, 2020), https://thehill.com/opinion/criminal-justice/
489442-covid-19-gives-us-an-urgent-argument-for-compassionate-release; ABA Section
of Civil Rights and Social Justice, COVID-19 and the Compassionate Release of the Eld-
erly, Infirm or High Risk, YOUTUBE (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=tknZc4k_83Q&feature=b_title.
50. See Sarah L. Cooper, A Case for Broadening Arizona’s Approach to Compas-
sionate Release, 13 L. J. SOC. JUST. 3, 9 (2020) (“There is much scholarship evaluating
issues associated with compassionate release. This includes discussions around the
broader relationships between incarceration and health(care); the intersection of com-
passion with politics and the purposes of punishment; international law standards for
prisoners; health issues for specific populations (e.g., the elderly); terminal illness in the
prison context; and the roles and competencies of corrections, healthcare professionals,
and parole boards.”).
51. See, e.g., PRICE, supra note 3; Marjorie P. Russell, Too Little, Too Late, Too
Slow: Compassionate Release of Terminally Ill Prisoners—Is the Cure Worse Than the
Disease?, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 799 (1994); Gartner & del Carmen, supra note 4; Cooper,
supra note 1.
180 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54
sionate release procedures, including a lack of appeal, reporting, and
tracking systems; noting such absences can frustrate the evaluation of
procedures.  A 1994 study commented on a lack of the right to ap-
peal52 in certain procedures and found only two states had some form
of mandatory reporting requirements.53  The study recommended the
creation of “mechanisms by which data can be collected”54 so that pro-
cedures can be subject to “[essential] review and evaluation.”55  Simi-
larly, a 2016 study suggested that, to support the undertaking of
evaluation exercises, a model medical parole statute should “set re-
porting requirements for releasing authorities,”56 including numbers
of applications and reasons for decisions.57  A 2018 study of all state
procedures found “the majority of states do not provide prisoners de-
nied compassionate release a means to appeal the denial.”58  The
study recommended, “the right to appeal should be guaranteed” and
“[a]t best, a prisoner [should be able to] reapply after a set time.”59  It
also echoed calls for mandatory data collection after finding “[m]ore
than half of the states do not track or collect any data on how many
people apply for and receive compassionate release . . . .”60  The study
commented, “[k]nowing who asks for compassionate release, who is
denied, and why and how those requests are decided is essential to
improving outcomes . . . .”61  Such information will help shape “ra-
tional[ ] public policy”62 that aids “appropriate decisions as to medical
releases into the community.”63
52. Russell, supra note 13, at 824. (“Finally, clemency programs, even those
targeted to compassionate release, may suffer from a lack of due process protections and
appeal rights.”).
53. Id. at 832.  (“Only Idaho and New York have provisions requiring that statis-
tics be maintained and that annual reports be prepared on the program. Idaho requires
reports to both of its Senate and House Judiciary Committees, including the names of
released prisoners, their medical conditions, and their current status. New York’s law
requires more complex case tracking.”).
54. Id. at 835.
55. Id.
56. Gartner & del Carmen, supra note 4, at 17.
57. Id. (“To facilitate the evaluation of medical parole programs, jurisdictions
should set reporting requirements for releasing authorities. The statute should indicate
what information the releasing authority is required to report. At a minimum, the re-
porting requirements should include the number of applications, referrals, and/or rec-
ommendations for the medical parole of inmates, the number of those petitions that are
granted, and the number of medical parolees who are returned to custody and the rea-
son for that return.”).




62. Greifinger, supra note 24, at 236.
63. Id.
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With this in mind, strategies for investigating what petitioners
and appellate authorities perceive as unfair in compassionate release
procedures are required.  One simple strategy is to examine an acces-
sible and sizeable data set where such issues might be publicly aired,
namely medical parole-related petitions in U.S. courts.64  Applying
standard interrogation techniques on Westlaw U.S. for references to
“medical parole” in state and federal cases, the authors generated a
case law data set comprised of thirty-seven cases.65  These cases were
analyzed within the context of the following research questions:
1. What issues do petitioners raise in medical parole-related pe-
titions to U.S. courts?
2. How do courts resolve such petitions?
3. Do the approaches of petitioners and courts highlight existing
concerns about compassionate release?
Part III reports the authors’ analysis of the data set.
III. RESEARCH FINDINGS
Each case was deconstructed by parties, court, citation (including
year), claim(s), outcome(s), and reasoning.  These details were then
mapped against existing concerns about compassionate release.  Sub-
section A reports on the first question, the types of issues raised by
petitioners in medical parole-related petitions in U.S. courts.  Subsec-
tion B merges the second and third questions, providing a commen-
tary on the resolution of relevant petitions and how approaches of
petitioners and judges map to existing concerns about compassionate
release.
A. ISSUES RAISED IN MEDICAL PAROLE-RELATED PETITIONS
The data set shows a generally expected variation of claims and
legal framing.  Claims include concerns about frustrated access to the
medical parole process; the denial of medical parole; irregularities in
medical parole processes (generally and through the actions of individ-
uals); improper application of eligibility and exclusion criteria; and in-
adequate medical care in prison.66  Claims are framed as violations of
the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, as
breaches of state constitutions and laws, in furtherance of applications
64. Given it is the most common method of compassionate release, medical parole-
related petitions were hypothesized to yield a sizable data set.
65. See Appendix for a full list of the cases. Note not all cases are described in this
paper and that pro se categorizations are based on information available in the case
report.
66. See infra Part III(B) for specific examples across the cases.
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for habeas corpus, and as a form of injunctive relief.67  This tapestry
is, overall, unsurprising.  Existing research acknowledges concerns
about access to and the make-up of compassionate release processes;68
the roles, competencies, and resources of relevant decision-makers
and institutions;69 burdensome eligibility and exclusion practices;70
and the challenges of providing adequate medical care in prisons.71
Given that these issues naturally emerge within the context of impris-
onment, framing them through reference to the Eighth Amendment
and habeas corpus is unsurprising.  The use of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as a vehicle is also predictable given the potential for the parole
process to attract due process protections.  Petitioners pursuing in-
junctive relief (i.e., a court order that medical parole be granted) is
understandable in context too.
B. RESOLUTION OF PETITIONS AND MAPPING TO EXISTING CONCERNS
ABOUT COMPASSIONATE RELEASE
The authors were able to map their analysis of the claims, out-
comes, and reasoning involved in each case to four thematic areas of
existing concern about compassionate release.72  This subsection re-
ports on each theme.
1. Eligibility and Exclusions
Eligibility for compassionate release generally relates to serious
terminal, non-terminal, and/or age-related health issues.  However,
many procedures exclude prisoners based on non-health related
67. Id.
68. E.g., PRICE, supra note 3, at 13 (identifying “complex and time-consuming re-
view processes” as a barrier to compassionate release).
69. E.g., id. at 21 (recommending various forms of resource, training and support
for agents and institutions); see also Rhine et al., supra note 45; Bryant S. Green, As the
Pendulum Swings: The Reformation of Compassionate Release to Accommodate Chang-
ing Perceptions of Corrections, 46 U. TOL. L. REV. 123 (2014).
70. E.g., PRICE, supra note 3, at 13 (identifying “strict or vague eligibility require-
ments and categorical exclusions” as barriers to compassionate release).
71. See generally, e.g., CLOUD, supra note 22; NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L
ACADS., supra note 17; NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., HEALTH AND INCAR-
CERATION - A WORKSHOP SUMMARY (2013).
72. Although, naturally, the themes and case categorizations can overlap. The au-
thors made primary categorizations as appropriate in their view. See Appendix.
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grounds, including offender categorization,73 parole eligibility,74 and
minimum sentencing requirements.75
The scope of exclusion categories has been challenged.  In Baker v.
State,76 a challenge was made to the Alaska Special Medical Parole
statute, which allowed certain “severely disabled”77 prisoners to apply
for early release.78  The original 1995 statute excluded one group:
prisoners who had been convicted of sexual abuse of a minor in the
first, second, or third degree.79  In 2003, the legislature broadened this
to include other sexual assault offenses,80 capturing Baker, who had
committed an attempted sexual assault in 1984 (before the enactment
of any form of special medical parole).81  Baker challenged the retro-
spective application of the broader exclusion to him, arguing it vio-
lated the ex post facto clause of the Alaska Constitution.82  Baker
argued the exclusion was “so punitive in effect as to constitute [an
additional] punishment.”83  The court disagreed, finding that the ex-
clusion “simply returned Baker to the position he was in at the time
he committed his 1984 offense”84 and that any challenge to the exclu-
sion policy should be directed at the state legislature.85
Categorical exclusions, like that in Baker, have been described as
an obstacle to compassionate release,86 yet a 2016 study identified
them as typical, noting that there is “wide variation in the types of
73. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 3055 (West 2017) (excluding inmates convicted of
first-degree murder of a “peace officer”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-123.51c (West 2018) (ex-
cluding inmates convicted of “violent offenses” like murder, manslaughter, and aggra-
vated sexual assault).
74. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 3055 (excluding inmates sentenced to life without
the possibility of parole); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3728 (West 2014) (excluding inmates
sentenced to death or life without the possibility of parole).
75. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-2-201 (West 2020) (setting 20-year and 10-year
limits on eligibility for inmates convicted of Class 1 and Class 2 felonies, respectively);
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-r (McKinney 2015) (requiring inmates convicted of certain violent
crimes to complete one-half of the sentence to become eligible for medical parole).
76. No. A-12661, 2017 WL 4570573 (Alaska Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2017).
77. Baker v. State, No. A-12661, 2017 WL 4570573, at *1 (Alaska Ct. App. Oct. 11,
2017).
78. Baker, No. A-12661, 2017 WL 4570573, at *1.
79. Id.  Note, this exclusion contained one exception: if a prisoner convicted of sex-
ual abuse of a minor under ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.434-438 had become a quadriplegic
since the time of the offense or the parole or probation violation for which he was incar-
cerated, that person was eligible for special medical parole. Id.
80. Id.  The expansion also removed any exception to the sexual abuse of a minor
exclusion for quadriplegia. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at *2.
84. Id.
85. Id. at *3.
86. PRICE, supra note 3, at 13.
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violent offenses that exclude an inmate from medical parole[ ].”87  Re-
search urges exclusions be clearly explained88 (such as a clear state-
ment about whether they apply to convictions prior to the
establishment of the procedure) and primarily based on a prisoner’s
present medical condition(s).89  Families Against Mandatory Mini-
mums (“FAMM”) recommends “that all eligible prisoners are consid-
ered for compassionate release, notwithstanding their crime,
sentence, or amount of time left to serve.”90
Procedures describe eligibility in different ways.91  Generally,
however, relevant criteria tend to encompass elevated standards of
proof.92  Courts have expressly referenced this.  In Davidson v. Mary-
land Parole Commission,93 for example, the petitioner sought injunc-
tive relief mandating he be granted medical parole,94 alleging he
suffered from multiple sclerosis.95  In rejecting the claim based on a
lack of supporting evidence that the prisoner met the relevant eligibil-
ity criteria, namely to be “so debilitated or incapacitated by a medical
or mental health condition, disease, or syndrome as to be physically
incapable of presenting a danger to society,”96 the court observed “the
standard is exceptionally high.”97
87. Gartner & del Carmen, supra note 4, at 6.
88. Id. at 14-15 (“It is equally important for statutes to state the reasons why an
inmate is disqualified from consideration. The disqualification should be clear in the
statute and references to disqualifying statutes, if any, should be included.”); see id. at
15-16 (listing reasons for which inmates are exempt from consideration).
89. Russell, supra note 13, at 833 (“All terminally ill prisoners should be eligible
for compassionate release.  Once we are dealing with someone suffering from a terminal
illness, penologic considerations are secondary.  In light of current societal values ad-
dressing death with dignity, considerations of punishment, deterrence, and rehabilita-
tion should no longer come into play.  The seriousness of the crime is not deprecated if
we permit the terminally ill to die outside the hostile confines of prison.  This is cer-
tainly true when a predicate to release is a finding that the prisoner no longer poses a
threat to society.  Thus, no crimes or sentences should serve as a basis for exclusion, nor
should minimum time served requirements be imposed.”).
90. PRICE, supra note 3, at 21.
91. See Cooper, supra note 50 at 14. (“Eligibility for compassionate release gener-
ally relates to serious terminal, non-terminal, and/or age-related health issues.  Non-
terminal conditions are described varyingly, but typically require prisoners be subject to
serious medical conditions/disabilities that significantly incapacitate them.  Mental
health is occasionally included.  Age is referenced in various ways.  Tens of procedures
expressly reference “terminal” within eligibility criteria, with many including a tempo-
ral reference.  These references range from that death must be ‘imminent,’ to that it
must occur within 24 months.”).
92. Id.
93. No. CIV.A. JFM-13-250, 2013 WL 1830097 (D. Md. Apr. 30, 2013).
94. Davidson v. Maryland Parole Comm’n, No. CIV.A. JFM-13-250, 2013 WL
1830097, at *1 (D. Md. Apr. 30, 2013).
95. Davidson, No. CIV.A. JFM-13-250, 2013 WL 1830097, at *2.
96. Id. at *5.
97. Id. at *4.
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Further, there is evidence of releasing authorities applying crite-
ria in an elevated way, particularly as it pertains to assessments con-
cerning public safety.  For example, in In re Martinez,98 a quadriplegic
inmate petitioned for habeas corpus, seeking review of a parole board
decision to deny medical parole.99  It was accepted Martinez met the
criteria for permanent medical incapacitation, but the board relied on
his history of disciplinary problems and commitment offenses to con-
clude he “remains a violent person who is capable of using others to
carry out his threats, and that he would also be a public safety threat
to those who attend him outside the prison walls.”100  On review, the
court sought to establish if there was some evidence101 to support the
board’s position.  It found there was not, noting “Martinez’s physical
condition severely limits his ability to harm others.”102  The court
granted Martinez’s parole, deferring to the board to set conditions.103
Jewell v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County104 provides
another example.  The parole board had approved Jewell for compas-
sionate release, concluding he was terminally ill with fewer than six
months to live and posed no risk to public safety.105  The releasing
authority—the trial court—rejected the approval, however, finding in-
sufficient evidence of both Jewell’s life expectancy prognosis and lack
of danger to public safety.106  The court based the latter finding on the
fact that his release plans had changed and provided possible access to
alcohol.107  The reviewing court noted Jewell had disproved his prog-
nosis, but underscored there was no “dispute in the record that he is
[clinically judged to be] terminally ill.”108  The court also accepted
Jewell habitually abused alcohol and other substances109 at the time
of his offenses, but it rejected that there was a reasonable possibility
that his host would allow him to obtain alcohol and access a vehicle, or
that he—in his weak and emaciated state—would elect to carry out
such actions.110  To find otherwise, the reviewing court determined,
would be to encourage “arbitrary, inconsistent decision-making”111
98. 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 657 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012).
99. In re Martinez, 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 657, 659-60 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012).
100. In re Martinez, 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 663.
101. Id. at 658.
102. Id. at 673.
103. Id. at 679.
104. No. E065047, 2016 WL 1535879 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2016).
105. Jewell v. Superior Court of San Bernardino Cty., No. E065047, 2016 WL
1535879, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2016).
106. Jewell, No. E065047, 2016 WL 1535879, at *1.
107. Id.
108. Id. at *3.
109. Id. at *4.
110. Id. at *5.
111. Id.
186 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54
about risk and frustrate the intended reach of the compassionate re-
lease statute.  The court ordered Jewell’s release.112
The decisions in Martinez and Jewell lend support to the idea that
eligibility criteria should not be unduly strict, cruel, or vague,113 and
that the assessment of a prisoner’s risk to public safety should be
nuanced and evidence-informed, reflecting that ill health likely les-
sens that risk.114  Also, in navigating Jewell’s survival beyond his
original prognosis, the Jewell court evidenced understanding of the
challenges associated with prognostication, showing alignment with
concerns about over-relying on the accuracy of end-of-life predictions,
including in the specific context of compassionate release.115  Ap-
proaching such predictions inflexibly can result in eligibility criteria
being overly burdensome.  Time can run out, for example.  In People v.
McCarty,116  McCarty had multiple sclerosis and was reported to be
“paralyzed in all four extremities”117 requiring “total care.”118  Medi-
cal parole was granted with the parties stipulating McCarty had an
incurable disease, was expected to die within one year, and was physi-
cally incapacitated.119  The superior court, however, denied relief, con-
cerned that it could not “be assured that he does not pose a threat to
public safety”120 and compassionate release would not allow for re-
112. Id.
113. PRICE, supra note 3, at 13-14 (reporting strict and vague requirements); id. at
21 (recommending to “[r]emove unduly strict, cruel, or otherwise unwarranted eligibil-
ity requirements”).
114. Id. at 8 (“As prisoners age or experience declining health, their threat to public
safety lessens, as do some of the justifications for continuing to hold them behind
bars.”).
115. Jalila Jefferson-Bullock, Are You (Still) My Great and Worthy Opponent?: Com-
passionate Release of Terminally Ill Offenders, 83 UMKC L. REV. 521, 559 (2015) (quot-
ing Brie A. Williams et al., Balancing Punishment and Compassion for Seriously Ill
Prisoners, 155 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 2, 122-23 (2011)) (“Governmental entities, policy
leaders, academics, and medical experts all agree that the compassionate release sys-
tem is ill-constructed.  According to medical professionals, compassionate release proce-
dures need to be reformed because they are ‘critically flawed’ and because ‘procedural
barriers may . . . limit their rational application.’  In their words, ‘[w]e argue that the
medical eligibility criteria of many compassionate-release guidelines are clinically
flawed because of their reliance on the inexact science of prognostication, and additional
procedural barriers may further limit rational application.  Given that early release is
politically and socially charged and that eligibility is based largely on medical evidence,
it is critical that such medical evaluation be based on the best possible scientific evi-
dence and that the medical profession help minimize medically related procedural
barriers.’ ”).
116. No. A135608, 2013 WL 1278503 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2013).
117. People v. McCarty, No. A135608, 2013 WL 1278503, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar.
29, 2013).
118. McCarty, No. A135608, 2013 WL 1278503, at *2 (“He requires total care in
regards to nutrition, going to the bathroom, and bathing.  His prognosis is profoundly
poor with no likelihood of clinical improvement.”).
119. Id.
120. Id. at *3.
2021] REFORMING COMPASSIONATE RELEASE 187
lease conditions.121  McCarty appealed, but died shortly after, render-
ing the issues raised moot.122
There is evidence, however, of some reviewing courts implicitly
recognizing the pliable nature of end-of-life predictions.  In New Jersey
v. Alston,123 Alston was given six months to live due to cancer, trigger-
ing eligibility for medical parole.  A public defender was appointed to
represent him.124  Alston’s application was denied because his progno-
sis improved.125  He was still terminal, but his revised prognosis ex-
ceeded six months, rendering him ineligible for medical parole.126
The trial court noted the public defender had not had ample time to
investigate, including time to collate medical evidence, but denied the
relevant petition, and so Alston appealed.127 The reviewing court re-
manded the case back to the trial court, finding “the changing nature
of defendant’s medical status and the lack of a complete investiga-
tion”128 meant much of the information before the trial court was in-
complete and outdated.
2. Releasing Authorities
Compassionate release methods include parole,129 executive
clemency/commutation,130 reprieves,131 sentence modifications,132 ex-
121. Id. (“The court expressed concern that compassionate release, unlike medical
parole, would be unconditional and without any mechanism to take McCarty back into
custody.”).
122. Id. at *1 (“Subsequent to filing this appeal, McCarty passed away in prison. We
therefore dismiss his appeal as moot.”).
123. No. A-1664-08T4, 2010 WL 2990898 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 29, 2010).
124. State v. Alston, No. A-1664-08T4, 2010 WL 2990898, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. July 29, 2010).
125. Alston, No. A-1664-08T4, 2010 WL 2990898, at *4.
126. Id.
127. Id. (rejecting pro se motion for a change of sentence).
128. Id. at *5.
129. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-424 (West 2008) (Wyoming’s “Medical Parole”
procedure); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-29-404 (West 2019) (Arkansas’s procedure for
“[m]edical parole for a terminal illness or permanent incapacitation”); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 54-131a (West 2004) (Connecticut’s procedure for “[r]elease of an inmate on medical
parole”).
130. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-403 (West 2009) (granting inmates eligibil-
ity for commutation if “in imminent danger of death due to a medical condition”); 220
IND. ADMIN. CODE § 1.1-4-1.5 (West 2013) (describing Indiana’s procedure for “[s]pecial
medical clemency”); Executive Clemency Process Summary, MICH. DEP’T OF CORRS.,
https://www.michigan.gov/corrections/0,4551,7-119-1435_11601-223452—,00.html (last
visited Oct., 27, 2019) (allowing recommendation for commutation for inmates with “a
deteriorating and/or terminal medical condition”).
131. See GA. CONST. art. IV, § II, para. II(e) (granting Georgia’s parole board power
to “issue a medical reprieve to an entirely incapacitated person”); 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 143.34 (West 2018) (granting the Texas parole board the authority to consider applica-
tions for “medical emergency reprieve”).
132. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4217 (West 2010) (giving Delaware courts the
power to modify sentences for, among other things, “serious medical illness or infir-
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tended confinement with supervision,133 respite programs,134 and fur-
loughs.135 This diversity leads to a variety of releasing authorities.
Naturally, parole authorities dominate as the relevant releasing au-
thority in the context of this paper.  There are benefits to utilizing pa-
role authorities for compassionate release.  As Russell remarks,
“[t]hese panels deal with release determinations on a daily basis.
They are accustomed to reviewing evidence, evaluating cases, balanc-
ing equities, and drawing conclusions.  They are also well prepared to
determine what conditions should be imposed in any given situa-
tion.”136  Two issues about the operation of parole authorities, how-
ever, emerge across the case law.
The first issue is the largely discretionary nature of parole, in-
cluding that parole does not necessarily attract a constitutionally pro-
tected interest.  Multiple cases expressly reference this characteristic.
In Bass v. Thomas137 the petitioner alleged the parole board’s refusal
to grant him medical parole was unconstitutional.  Bass’s claim failed
to identify an appropriate defendant, but nonetheless the court com-
mented that he would not be entitled to relief because he possessed no
liberty interest in parole protected by Due Process.138  The court cited
authority describing the rejection of parole as “merely a
disappointment.”139
mity”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 302.113 (West 2013) (allowing sentence modification for “an
extraordinary health condition”).
133. See, e.g., ME. STAT. tit. 34-A, § 3036-A.10 (West 2019) (including “[t]erminally
ill or incapacitated” inmates in Maine’s “[s]upervised community confinement” proce-
dure); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 302.113 (describing Wisconsin’s “[r]elease to extended supervi-
sion” procedure).
134. See W. VA. DIV. OF CORRS., WEST VIRGINIA DIVISION OF CORRECTIONS ANNUAL
REPORT: FY2018 45 (2018), https://dcr.wv.gov/resources/Documents/annual_reports/
WVDOC%2018%20Annual%20Report.pdf (charting releases under West Virginia’s
“Medical Respite” procedure).
135. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-233 (West 2012) (allowing inmates to seek
“medical treatment not available” to them); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 808 (West 2018)
(allowing inmates to be “place[d] on medical furlough”); ALA. CODE §§ 14-14-1–14-14-7
(West 2020) (comprising a range of statutes referred to in the text as the “Alabama
Medical Furlough Act”).
136. Russell, supra note 13, at 836.
137. No. 2:13-CV-88-WHA, 2016 WL 958906 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 18, 2016), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 2:13-CV-088-WHA, 2016 WL 958464 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 14,
2016).
138. Bass v. Thomas, No. 2:13-CV-88-WHA, 2016 WL 958906, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Feb.
18, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:13-CV-088-WHA, 2016 WL
958464 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 14, 2016).
139. Bass, No. 2:13-CV-88-WHA, 2016 WL 958906, at *3 (quoting Damiano v. Flor-
ida Parole and Probation Commission 785 F.2d 929, 933 (11th Cir. 1986)) (stating, “a
denial of parole does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation as such
action is ‘merely a disappointment rather than a punishment of cruel and unusual
proportions’ ”).
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This lack of a constitutionally protected interest is repeated in
Haughie v. Blumberg,140 where the petitioner alleged he suffered vari-
ous ailments following tumor surgery.  Rejecting Haughie’s claim that
his continued incarceration was unconstitutional, the court under-
lined that the Constitution “does not create a protected liberty interest
in the expectation of parole.”141  In F.M. Simmons v. Cannon,142 a
Texas prisoner argued he should be released on Medically Recom-
mended Intensive Supervision (“MRIS”) to receive needed care.143
Noting it lacked competence to authorize MRIS, the court underscored
that, per state law, MRIS “is entirely discretionary and that Simmons
has no constitutionally protected liberty interest in release on medical
parole.”144  The position of state law also steered the decision in Rob-
erts v. Conley.145  In that case, it was determined that a failure to
grant medical parole to a terminally ill prisoner and requiring him to
serve a five-year sentence following his failure to complete an alcohol
treatment program was lawful.  State law, the court observed, estab-
lished that parole of a prisoner with a terminal disease was
discretionary.146
References to parole authority discretion also appear in Eighth
Amendment-based challenges.  In Reynolds v. Crawford,147 for in-
stance, the petitioner described herself as suffering from “life threat-
ening”148 cardiomyopathy, and alleged the failure of prison officials to
recommend her for medical parole violated the Eighth Amendment.
In rejecting that such inaction would amount to a deliberate indiffer-
ence to a prisoner’s medical need, the court observed “the issuing of
medical parole is a determination to be made by the parole board, and
the failure to grant such parole, does not rise to the level of cruel and
unusual punishment.”149
The second emerging issue is the highly deferential standard of
review applied by courts to parole authority decision-making.  Three
140. No. CV JFM-16-3201, 2016 WL 5477557 (D. Md. Sept. 29, 2016), aff’d in part,
appeal dismissed in part, 684 F. App’x 302 (4th Cir. 2017).
141. Haughie v. Blumberg, No. CV JFM-16-3201, 2016 WL 5477557, at *1 (D. Md.
Sept. 29, 2016), aff’d in part, appeal dismissed in part, 684 F. App’x 302 (4th Cir. 2017).
142. No. CIV.A. 6:08CV304, 2009 WL 1350812 (E.D. Tex. May 12, 2009).
143. F.M. Simmons v. Cannon, No. CIV.A. 6:08CV304, 2009 WL 1350812, at *8
(E.D. Tex. May 12, 2009).
144. F.M. Simmons, No. CIV.A. 6:08CV304, 2009 WL 1350812, at *8.
145. No. 2:08CV00044 ERW, 2009 WL 2170173 (E.D. Mo. July 20, 2009).
146. Roberts v. Conley, No. 2:08CV00044 ERW, 2009 WL 2170173, at *4 (E.D. Mo.
July 20, 2009) (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 217.250 (2020)) (“Missouri law states that
when an ‘offender is afflicted with a disease that is terminal’ the board of probation and
parole ‘in their discretion may grant a medical parole.’ ”).
147. No. 206CV00009 ERW, 2007 WL 586800 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 21, 2007).
148. Reynolds v. Crawford, No. 206CV00009 ERW, 2007 WL 586800, at *1 (E.D. Mo.
Feb. 21, 2007).
149. Reynolds, No. 206CV00009 ERW, 2007 WL 586800, at *5.
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New York cases illustrate this. These cases articulate that to be
usurped on review, parole authority decision-making must exhibit “ir-
rationality bordering on impropriety.”150  In Black v. New York State
Board of Parole,151 the decision of a parole authority to reject a
quadriplegic prisoner’s application for medical parole based not only
on medical documentation but also on a review of various factors in-
cluding the petitioner’s crime, criminal history, prison disciplinary re-
cord, program accomplishments and post-release plans, did not meet
this standard.  A similar view was taken in Trobiano v. State of New
York Division of Parole152 where the Parole Board’s emphasis on the
seriousness of the prisoner’s crime (as opposed to his failing health)
was permissible within the board’s discretion.  In Ifill v. Wright,153 a
parole commissioner’s decision to reject medical parole based on a re-
view of relevant medical documentation, despite a recommendation
from medical staff that Ifill be eligible, also did not meet the standard.
The discretionary nature of parole and highly deferential stan-
dards of review further narrow the scope of compassionate release, re-
sulting in a cul-de-sac for petitioners.  The case law brightly
illuminates how crucial parole authority decision-making is.  This ar-
guably adds to calls for two particular research recommendations.
First, parole authorities should be further supported in their deci-
sion-making.  As Rhine et al. suggest, “[t]he institutional structure
and composition of parole boards should be reconstituted to ensure
members possess the requisite education, expertise, and independence
relative to release decision making.”154  In compassionate release
cases, this likely involves specific support for understanding such
things as complex medical evidence, clinical practices (e.g., around di-
agnosis and prognosis), and healthcare operations and infrastructures
inside and outside of corrections facilities.  A further fostering of cross-
cultural competency between parole authorities, healthcare profes-
sionals and corrections needs to be coordinated.  Second,  compassion-
ate release procedures should have integrated accountability
mechanisms, such as reporting and tracking systems and internal ap-
peal processes.  Such practices would generate important records of
the decision-making process, improving both the ability of petitioners
and parole authorities to substantiate their claims and decision-mak-
ing respectively.  Specifically, the latter practice would allow parole
150. Black v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 920 N.Y.S.2d 744, 745 (N.Y. App. Div.
2011) (quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77
(1980)).
151. 920 N.Y.S.2d 744 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).
152. 728 N.Y.S.2d 269 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
153. 941 N.Y.S.2d 812 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012).
154. Rhine et al., supra note 45, at 282-83.
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authorities to unpack local decisions more readily, reflecting such
cases inherently often concern sensitive and changing circumstances.
The need to rethink discretionary parole release generally is recog-
nized across stakeholders, with some considering it “an auspicious
time to rethink the future and functions of parole boards.”155  Across
their case load, parole authorities are “well positioned to play crucial
roles in engineering new approaches,”156 and this should include com-
passionate release.
3. Processes
Compassionate release processes vary.  As one study found, “[t]he
sheer number of individuals and entities, and/or combinations . . .
charged with decision-making regarding candidates for medical parole
can be staggering.”157  Recommendations urge that processes be
streamlined and clear.158  Issues across these two points of focus
emerge in the case law.
The streamlining of procedures, for example, presents in Tatta v.
State.159  Claiming, inter alia, that he was suffering from “several se-
rious illnesses,”160 Tatta challenged the parole board’s decision to or-
der that he wait twenty-four months before reconsideration of his
unsuccessful parole application.  Despite acknowledging that Tatta
suffered from “various illnesses,”161 the reviewing court found his
claim lacked merit, noting he did not qualify for medical parole and
that the parole board had properly exercised its discretionary deci-
sion-making.  Research has noted that the “majority of states do not
provide prisoners denied compassionate release a means to appeal the
denial”162 and suggested, “the right to appeal should be guaran-
teed,”163 with a prisoner at least being able to “reapply after a set
time.”164  The period that must elapse before a reapplication should
reflect the changing and sensitive nature of ill health.  The inclusion
155. Id. at 327.
156. Id. at 328.
157. Gartner & del Carmen, supra note 4, at 11.
158. E.g., Russell, supra note 13, at 832-33.  (“Because of the exigent nature of ter-
minal illness, any compassionate release program should be constructed so that cases
can be expeditiously processed. . . .  The more complex the system, the less likely that it
will be efficient in accomplishing its goal . . . .”)
159. 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
160. Tatta v. State, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163, 164 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
161. Tatta, 737 N.Y.S.2d at 164.
162. PRICE, supra note 3, at 19.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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of express time limits in processes to reflect the need for expedited
review is also encouraged.165
Concerning clarity, case law shows prisoners raising specific is-
sues associated with—separately—process evidence requirements and
process agents.  Regarding the former, Beale v. Ward166 provides sup-
ports for the need to itemize evidence requirements.  In that case, the
petitioner was receiving cancer treatment.  He alleged a due process
violation based on the alleged destruction by an administrator of a
physician’s letter recommending that he be released on medical pa-
role.167  This, he argued, prevented the Oklahoma Pardon and Parole
Board from considering him for medical parole.168  The reviewing
court identified this as a cognizable claim.  This arguably presses the
need for processes to include clear instructions on the handling and
itemizing of evidence, a practice recommended for inclusion in model
medical parole procedures.169
Poydras v.  Louisiana Dept. of Public Safety and Corrections170
relates to clarity about the process agent(s) tasked with identifying
eligible prisoners.  In that case, the Department of Corrections was
the agency given competence to make eligibility decisions,171 and
Poydras complained about the department’s refusal to refer him for
consideration for medical parole.172  The reviewing court rejected the
complaint for lack of appropriate legal posture.173  Research encour-
165. See id. at 21 (“Establish time frames within which document-gathering, assess-
ment, and decision-making must occur that are realistic, provide sufficient time to de-
velop informed decisions, and are sensitive to the need for expedited review in the case
of terminal illness.”); Gartner & del Carmen, supra note 4, at 16 (“For the process
description to be even more useful, jurisdictions should state specific time limits for the
consideration process and the length of the decision period from time of application to
the final release decision.”).
166. No. CIV-05-253-M, 2005 WL 1322877 (W.D. Okla. June 1, 2005).
167. Beal v. Ward, No. CIV-05-253-M, 2005 WL 1322877, at *1 (W.D. Okla. June 1,
2005).
168. Beal, No. CIV-05-253-M, 2005 WL 1322877, at *1.
169. Gartner & del Carmen, supra note 4, at 15-16 (recommending that statutes
“[l]ist and define necessary documentation for consideration” and “describe how these
documents should be delivered—full report, separately as they are completed, etc.—and
to whom the documents must be delivered”).
170. No. 2012 CA 1475, 2013 WL 1196587 (La. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2013), writ denied,
125 So.3d 424 (La. Nov. 1, 2013).
171. Poydras v. La. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr., No. 2012 CA 1475, 2013 WL
1196587, at *1 (La. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2013), writ denied, 125 So.3d 424 (La. Nov. 1,
2013) (“[T]he Department was the entity that shall identify those inmates who might be
eligible for medical parole.”).
172. Poydras, No. 2012 CA 1475, 2013 WL 1196587, at *2 (“In the instant matter,
the petitioner’s complaints concern the conditions of his confinement and the Depart-
ment’s refusal to refer him for consideration for medical parole.”).
173. Id. (“On the basis of these complaints, he alleges he is entitled to an immediate
release. However, these complaints do not constitute a true request for criminal post-
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ages the proactive identification of eligible prisoners.174  Corrections
personnel are in an unrivalled position to build familiarity with pris-
oners and, thus, an (albeit lay) sensitivity to any changing health sta-
tus.  Noting this, FAMM recommends that corrections personnel be
trained to “understand eligibility criteria for compassionate re-
lease”175 and be taught “how to identify eligible prisoners and make it
their duty to do so.”176  Naturally, however, these ideas have tensions
with available expertise and resources. Wylie v. Montana Women’s
Prison177 concerns the clarity with which process agents communicate
about compassionate release.  Wylie alleged that the prison warden
did not present her request for a medical parole hearing to the Board
of Pardons and Parole.178  Wylie provided her medical parole applica-
tion to the prison on July 23, 2011.179  On January 9, 2012, prison
officials informed Wylie that her application had been denied.  She re-
quested a formal denial and on June 1, 2012 was told the prison was
“trying to get the paperwork.”180  On July 2, 2012, Wylie received a
response from the warden indicating that her medical parole was “dis-
approved”181 because it did not meet the criteria.182  Wylie never re-
ceived any paperwork from the Board of Pardons and Parole.183  Wylie
alleged the prison never sent her request for medical parole to the
Board of Pardons and Parole.184  The reviewing court determined a
claim could proceed against the warden.185  More broadly, however,
Wylie raises questions about expediency and the need to keep process-
users informed.  Specifically, FAMM recommends to “[k]eep prisoners,
family members, and advocates informed at each stage of the assess-
ment and decision-making process.”186
4. Support for Petitioners
Compassionate release procedures (including medical parole) in-
volve multi-agency interactions.  Across these agencies, procedures al-
conviction habeas relief since they do not attack the petitioner’s conviction or
sentence.”)
174. See PRICE, supra note 3, at 21 (“Teach staff how to identify eligible prisoners
and make it their duty to do so.”).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. No. CV 13-53-BLG-SEH, 2014 WL 1871825 (D. Mont. May 8, 2014).
178. Wylie v. Montana Women’s Prison, No. CV 13-53-BLG-SEH, 2014 WL
1871825, at *9 (D. Mont. May 8, 2014).







186. See PRICE, supra note 3, at 21.
194 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54
low for various agents to be petitioners in compassionate release
cases, including prisoners, attorneys, relatives, corrections personnel,
and healthcare professionals.187  Research recommends establishing
further support for petitioners (especially prisoners).188  This could
take the shape of assisting petitioners in developing literacy about the
administrative and legal context, process, and substance of compas-
sionate release procedures.  Case law suggests there are lacunas in
such understanding, particularly in the context of prisoners acting pro
se and attempting to raise issues associated with compassionate
release.
There is evidence of prisoners struggling to follow specific direc-
tions.  In Alexander v. Grounds,189 Alexander petitioned the court to
release him on medical parole.  The court noted that Alexander had
been expressly directed on the need to “make clear how he is in cus-
tody in violation of the Constitution or federal law”190 and that he
must “first exhaust state judicial remedies,”191 but that he had failed
to do either.  He had also, despite being directed to file an amended
petition, filed ten motions.192  Alexander’s petition was denied for fail-
ing to present a cognizable claim.193
Similarly, in Austad v. Schweitzer,194 Austad—who was confined
to a wheelchair—alleged, inter alia, a denial of due process in his med-
ical parole hearing.195  The court noted that Austad had been given
the opportunity to amend his original complaint to remedy a defect in
the named defendants but had failed to do so.196  His civil rights
claims were dismissed.197 Poydras v. Louisiana Department of Public
Safety and Corrections198 provides another example.  After being de-
nied a referral for consideration for medical parole, Poydras filed a
petition captioned “Application For: Criminal Post-Conviction Habeas
Corpus,”199 alleging various wrongdoings.  Poydras was advised to
pay relevant fees or apply for pauper status, which he failed to do.200
187. Cooper, supra note 1, at 35-39; PRICE, supra note 3, at 17 (“Quite a few states
permit family members to begin the application process themselves.”).
188. See PRICE, supra note 3, at 21.
189. No. C 14-1928 EDL (PR), 2014 WL 5408407 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2014).
190. Alexander v. Grounds, No. C 14-1928 EDL (PR), 2014 WL 5408407, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 22, 2014).
191. Alexander, No. C 14-1928 EDL (PR), 2014 WL 5408407, at *2.
192. Id. at *1.
193. Id.
194. No. CV08-32H-DWM-JCL, 2008 WL 5416389 (D. Mont. June 12, 2008).
195. Austad v. Schweitzer, No. CV08-32H-DWM-JCL, 2008 WL 5416389, at *1 (D.
Mont. June 12, 2008).
196. Austad, No. CV08-32H-DWM-JCL, 2008 WL 5416389, at *1.
197. Id. at *4.
198. Poydras, No. 2012 CA 1475, 2013 WL 1196587.
199. Id. at *1.
200. Id.
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Subsequently, the commissioner noted the matter as civil, rather than
criminal, since Poydras did not raise any post-conviction claims.201
Poydras appealed, arguing, inter alia, this reclassification was an er-
ror.202  The court disagreed, explaining:
[A]lthough the petitioner labeled his pleadings as applica-
tions for post-conviction habeas relief, Louisiana courts look
beyond the caption, style, and form of pleadings to determine
from the substance of the pleadings the true nature of the
proceeding.  Thus, a pleading is construed for what it really
is, not for what it is erroneously called.203
Poydras’s struggle to develop a legally substantive petition is rep-
licated in other cases. Some petitions are expressly dismissed for
wholly lacking substance.  For example, in F.M. Simmons v. Can-
non,204 Simmons’s claim that he should be released on medical parole
was described as “frivolous,”205 as were the claims made in Anderson
v. Thompson,206 a case that involved a prisoner with an allegedly long
list of health issues.  In Gross v. Buescher,207 Gross’s allegation that
inadequate budgets demonstrated a deliberate indifference to his seri-
ous medical needs was described as “totally meritless,”208 as were
claims made in Foreman v. Director TDCJ-CID.209  There are other
examples of prisoners submitting petitions that are time barred or
without exhausting administrative remedies too.210  Further, Aponte
v. Board of Parole Commissioners211 and Dinkins v. Correctional Med-
ical Services212 both provide examples of courts expressly relying on
their duty to show liberality toward pro se litigants213 in order to re-




204. No. CIV.A. 6:08CV304, 2009 WL 1350812 (E.D. Tex. May 12, 2009).
205. F.M. Simmons, No. CIV.A. 6:08CV304, 2009 WL 1350812, at *9.
206. No. CIV.A. 6:09CV244, 2010 WL 817182, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2010).
207. 791 F. Supp. 796 (E.D. Mo. 1992).
208. Gross v. Buescher, 791 F. Supp. 796, 798 (E.D. Mo. 1992).
209. No. 6:11CV116, 2011 WL 5080180, at *8 (E.D. Tex. July 12, 2011), report and
recommendation adopted No. 6:11CV116, 2011 WL 5080174 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2011)
(specifically stating that the petitioner’s medical parole-related claim lacked merit).
210. E.g., Rodriguez v. Johnson, No. CIV. A. G-06-0768, 2008 WL 2403722 (S.D.
Tex. June 10, 2008).
211. No. 9:17-CV-0305 (GTS/DEP), 2017 WL 8780766, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. July 14,
2017) (“Construing the complaint liberally, plaintiff may also allege that he was denied
medical parole release without due process.”).
212. No. 06-4303 CVCNKL, 2007 WL 927742, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 23, 2007) (“Al-
though plaintiff’s allegations may not be sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss or
for summary judgment, they are sufficient, when liberally construed, to allow plaintiff
to proceed at this stage.”).
213. See Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
214. No. 1:14-CV-01569-AWI, 2014 WL 7178217 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2014).
196 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54
court seemingly having to read into a petition, with the court stating
Marks’s complaint—which it expressly noted comprised “nearly 400
pages”215—“appear[ed] to seek medical parole.”216
Cases also show prisoners using improper legal vehicles for rais-
ing their claim(s) or asking courts to act outside of their competence.
For example, in Madsen v. Guyer,217 Madsen filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus to request that the court order the Montana Depart-
ment of Corrections to place his medical parole application before the
Board of Pardons and Parole.  Denying the petition, the court stated,
“[h]abeas corpus relief is not the appropriate remedy for challenges to
an inmate’s conditions of confinement,”218 and “[t]his Court does not
direct the administration of parole applications before the Board or sit
in review of the Board concerning parole and its process.”219 Haughie
v. Blumberg220 provides another example.  Haughie challenged the
decision of the Maryland Parole Commission finding him ineligible for
medical parole, seeking both monetary damages and an order requir-
ing his release on medical parole.221 In dismissing the petition, the
court commented on both the lack of cognizable/evidenced claims, and
its lack of jurisdiction over directing state employees as requested.222
Further, in Polansky v Wrenn,223 a prisoner alleged a violation of due
process in his medical parole proceedings, but the claim put forward
was found to present “a distinct cause of action involving a different
set of defendants, and issues that are largely unrelated to the claims
presently pending in this action”224 and was therefore denied.
Notably, across these cases, examples of the possible material im-
plications of these lacunas in understanding also emerge.  These in-
clude petitions being dismissed with prejudice,225 prisoners losing
215. Marks v. Johnson, No. 1:14-CV-01569-AWI, 2014 WL 7178217, at *1 (E.D. Cal.
Dec. 16, 2014).
216. Marks, No. 1:14-CV-01569-AWI, 2014 WL 7178217, at *1.
217. No. OP 18-0699, 2018 WL 6845237 (Mont. Dec. 27, 2018).
218. Madsen v. Guyer, No. OP 18-0699, 2018 WL 6845237, at *1 (Mont. Dec. 27,
2018).
219. Madsen, No. OP 18-0699, 2018 WL 6845237, at *1
220. No. CV JFM-16-3201, 2016 WL 5477557 (D. Md. Sept. 29, 2016), aff’d in part,
dismissed in part, 684 F. App’x 302 (4th Cir. 2017).
221. Haughie v. Blumberg, No. CV JFM-16-3201, 2016 WL 5477557, at *1 (D. Md.
Sept. 29, 2016), aff’d in part, appeal dismissed in part, 684 F. App’x 302 (4th Cir. 2017).
222. Haughie, No. CV JFM-16-3201, 2016 WL 5477557, at *1-2.
223. No. 12-CV-105-PB, 2013 WL 1165158 (D.N.H. Feb. 22, 2013), report and recom-
mendation adopted sub nom. Polansky v. N.H. Dep’t of Corr., No. 12-CV-105-PB, 2013
WL 1155429 (D.N.H. Mar. 19, 2013).
224. Polansky v. Wrenn, No. 12-CV-105-PB, 2013 WL 1165158, at *3 (D.N.H. Feb.
22, 2013), report and recommendation adopted sub nom., Polansky v. N.H. Dep’t of
Corr., No. 12-CV-105-PB, 2013 WL 1155429 (D.N.H. Mar. 19, 2013).
225. E.g., Rodriguez , No. CIV. A. G-06-0768, 2008 WL 2403722; F.M. Simmons, No.
CIV.A. 6:08CV304, 2009 WL 1350812; Foreman, TDCJ-CID, No. 6:11CV116, 2011 WL
5080180.
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opportunities to resolve matters more efficiently,226 and prisoners
risking incurring financial penalties.227
Various recommendations for contributing to remedying gaps in
understanding have been offered.228  A common thread across these
ideas is the development of cross-cultural competencies, i.e., common
understandings between agents involved in compassionate release
procedures—who inherently have their own specific roles, training,
and sensitivities.  Fostering such cross-agency collaboration is of
“practical importance”229 so as to limit conflicts, and to remedy the so-
called “virtual black box between the initiation of consideration and
the decision to release.”230
Developing such understanding is largely about signposting, cre-
ating and delivering education opportunities, and fostering collegial-
ity, particularly as the latter relates to involving prisoners’ families in
compassionate release procedures.  Suggestions for reform include
publicizing compassionate release information across relevant institu-
tions, including the proactive signposting of procedure information to
prisoners and families (e.g., the provision of “detailed description[s]
and/or diagram[s]”231 that allow agents to follow case progress, and
including relevant information in prison handbooks232); the provision
of relevant resources (e.g., ensuring application forms are stocked in
prison libraries233); education programs (led by healthcare profession-
als) for criminal justice system agents (such as prisoners, corrections
personnel, and parole board members) about prisoner health(care)
needs and the meaning of compassionate release eligibility criteria;234
and training for healthcare professionals (led by criminal justice sys-
tem professionals) about the conditions of incarceration and the pres-
sures faced by criminal justice agencies.235  Specific recommendations
for ensuring that (1) lawyers are eligible petitioners in compassionate
release cases236 and (2) the right to counsel includes “all compassion-
226. E.g., Austad, No. CV08-32H-DWM-JCL, 2008 WL 5416389 (noting that due to
multiple failures by the plaintiff to amend his pleading properly, he had now lost the
ability to amend his pleading without the consent of the opposing party or with leave of
Court).
227. E.g., Marks, No. 1:14-CV-01569-AWI, 2014 WL 7178217, at *3 (noting possible
fee implications for petitioner).
228. E.g., PRICE, supra note 3, at 21.
229. NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 71, at 29.
230. Gartner & del Carmen, supra note 4, at 16.
231. Id.
232. PRICE, supra note 3, at 21.
233. Id.
234. See, e.g., NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 71, at 28-29.
235. Id.
236. PRICE, supra note 3, at 21.
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ate release proceedings, including appeals and revocations”237 also ex-
ist.  Our analysis of the case law generally supports the idea that this
suite of reforms should be further explored.
IV. CONCLUSION
Compassionate release procedures typically allow prisoners to
seek early release because of serious terminal, non-terminal, or age-
related health issues.238  These procedures, common across U.S. jus-
tice systems, generally lack comprehensive reporting and tracking
systems and internal appeals processes.  These absences contribute to
there being limited knowledge about, essentially, what petitioners and
appellate authorities perceive as unfair in the context of compassion-
ate release.  This lack of knowledge frustrates evaluation of existing
practices and the implementation of evidence-informed reform.
Given medical parole is the most common method of compassion-
ate release in the U.S, one strategy for generating knowledge—as re-
ported in this paper—is to study medical parole-related petitions in
U.S. courts.  Based on the data set generated by the methods utilized
in this paper, the authors suggest that such petitions can be mapped
to four thematic areas where concerns about compassionate release
practices already exist, namely: (1) eligibility and exclusions; (2)
processes; (3) releasing authorities; and (4) support for petitioners.  In
sum, across these themes, case law reveals that petitioners have
raised issues concerning frustrated access to the medical parole pro-
cess, the denial of medical parole, irregularities in medical parole
processes, improper application of eligibility and exclusion criteria,
and inadequate medical care in prison.  Judges generally dismiss peti-
tions, relying on the high standards of proof required to prove eligibil-
ity and improper parole-board decision-making; the discretionary
nature of parole; standards of review that are highly deferential to
parole authorities; and a lack of properly legally postured claims.
Based on an analysis of relevant case law in the context of ex-
isting concerns about compassionate release practices within each the-
matic area, the authors suggest particular issues for further
investigation include the:
1. Scope of exclusion categories (specifically the appropriateness
of both categorical exemptions and retrospective
applicability);
237. Id.
238. See generally Cooper, supra note 1.
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2. Appropriateness of elevated standards of proof for eligibility
(specifically in terms of evidence requirements, nuance, and
flexibility);
3. Level of procedural safeguards integrated within parole pro-
cedures, specifically for medical parole cases (including inter-
nal appeal processes, and reporting and tracking systems);
4. Streamlining and clarity of processes (specifically in terms of
expedited review requirements, the itemization of evidence
requirements, and the responsibilities of process agents); and
5. Design and delivery of appropriate training, education, and
support for agents across all institutions involved in compas-
sionate release procedures (including a specific focus on sup-
porting prisoners to develop and submit appropriate
applications).
Generally, these ideas add relative strength to existing calls for
reform across these areas and ultimately bolster the view that—to
properly serve the interests of both wider society and the large, age-
ing, and medically compromised prison population in the U.S.—com-
passionate release procedures require evidence-informed investment.
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